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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2016  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [SU](#) [KPKO](#)  
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE REQUEST ON UNMIS DARFUR  
DEPLOYMENT

REF: SECSTATE 138370

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR MOLLY PHEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)

¶1. (C) Summary: Reftel points were delivered August 23 to Mr. Robert Orr, Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Planning in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. Mr. Michael Heller Chu of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was also in attendance. We left a non-paper outlining reftel points. The Security Council is scheduled to meet August 24 so that the Ghanaian Presidency can push to hold an August 28 meeting on the Sudan despite the refusal of the Arab League and the Government of National Unity to attend. The P5 will meet August 28 to discuss the UK-U.S. draft resolution. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Following delivery of reftel points, Orr commented that the question of the timing of the AMIS transition to a UN operation was 'more than just an issue of timing.' He said previous efforts to expedite troop deployments had often backfired, citing Sierra Leone as a case where hasty Council action on mandating a peacekeeping force did not yield its desired result on the ground. Orr echoed DPKO's familiar stance (which he made a point to say 'was not just posturing') that premature assumption of command and control by the UN of the AU force would result in further dissolution of AMIS troop morale, an inability for the force to withstand the inevitable tests of its resolve and capabilities that would come from spoilers on the ground, and irreparable credibility loss to the UN were it to fail to meet the challenges of such a robust peacekeeping undertaking in Darfur.

¶3. (C) Further, Orr worried that the UN 'target date' of complete deployment by January 1, 2007, might be negatively affected by force generation demands that have arisen as a result of the Lebanon crisis. Orr noted that if promises of troop contributions from influential donors like India and Pakistan were diverted to UNIFIL, then an expanded UNMIS faced real problems in securing adequate numbers of troops for Darfur.

¶4. (C) Orr promised to relay our non-paper to SYG Annan and to follow up with DPKO U/SYG Guehenno and A/SYG Annabi in order to determine DPKO's stance regarding the UK-U.S. draft resolution, in particular OP5. He admitted he was not clear on what was expected of the UN under a 'rolling re-hat' scenario, but was optimistic that DPKO would do what it could to promote UNSC unity on this point. (Note: When first presented with the idea of an October 1 re-hatting, Guehenno reportedly called the notion 'barmy.').

¶5. (C) Orr noted that the UN had exhausted all of its diplomatic options with regard to seeking GNU consent for a

UN operation in Darfur. He added that appointment of a U.S. envoy would be a big step toward proving our engagement with Sudan was more than just 'grandstanding.'

#### Security Council Discussions

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¶6. (C) In subsequent discussions with UKUN, the UK expressed its desire that the draft resolution be adopted NLT August 31. To keep the negotiating ball moving, at the suggestion of Ambassador Bolton a meeting of P5 Ambassadors to sort out issues of timing and consent in the draft is being scheduled for August 28, following the planned Council session on that date. The Council Presidency circulated a letter August 23 from President Bashir recommending the meeting be postponed to allow the GNU more preparation time before engaging with the Council on consolidating peace in Darfur. The Arab League will not attend for the same reasons, and the OIC is expected to follow suit. Thus the only outsider participant is likely to be the AU. The Ghanaian Presidency will convene August 24 consultations to discuss the August 28 meeting. Frustrated by the delay tactic of the GNU and the AL, Ghana is seeking U.S. and UK support that the meeting proceed as planned.

#### Outreach to Interested Parties

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¶7. (C) In an informal outreach session hosted by UKUN and USUN with interested parties on Darfur (including the African Union, Egypt, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia and Turkey), it was clear for those interested parties that timing is still an issue and that efforts to delay are still ongoing. The Egyptian representative reiterated the Arab League position that the Council give the GNU room to address Darfur security via implementation of its proposed stabilization plan.

BOLTON